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The Empathic Foundations of Security Dilemma De-escalation
Joshua Baker
University of Leicester
Security dilemma theorists have long recognized the importance of empathy to the de-escalation of conflict 
between actors caught in security dilemma dynamics, but they have left empathy undertheorized and 
have neglected to recognize its deeply contested nature. This article responds to this omission by bringing 
multidisciplinary literature on empathy to bear on security dilemma thinking. Contrary to some contemporary 
empathy research that draws attention to its automatic, unconscious, and intuitive properties, the article 
highlights the deliberate, effortful, and reflexive capacity to empathize across complex social contexts such as 
security dilemma dynamics. It shows how empathy of this kind can lead actors to moderate their positions on key 
issues at the heart of a conflict, reinterpret their interests, and broaden the zone of possible agreement between 
themselves and an adversary. The article demonstrates these notions empirically by locating empathy within 
the de-escalation of tensions between the United States and Iran between 2009 and 2016. Drawing on primary 
interview material with former U.S. officials, the argument is made that the development of specific empathic 
capacities by key U.S. officials played an important and unrecognized role in the de-escalation of security 
dilemma dynamics between the United States and Iran.
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Nearly two decades ago Neta Crawford (2000) observed that “realist and idealist discourse 
about emotions—what has been said and not said about anger, fear, love, empathy, the desire for 
revenge, and so on—has shaped the discipline in important respects” (p. 156). This call to investigate 
the emotional underpinnings of key theories and concepts in IR has since been taken up by a number 
of scholars (e.g., Kertzer & McGraw, 2012; Ross, 2013; Solomon, 2014). However, of the emotional 
categories Crawford (2000) identified, comparatively little has been said by IR scholars about empa-
thy (key exceptions include Head, 2016a, 2016b; White, 1984). The aim of this article, therefore, is 
to partially address this omission and develop the relationship between emotional phenomena and IR 
theory further still by exploring the place of empathy in security dilemma thinking.
The nexus between empathy and the security dilemma is a productive site for scholarship on 
emotions and IR as empathy has occupied an implicit yet important place in security dilemma think-
ing for decades. John Herz, who first coined the term “security dilemma” (1950), was the first to 
theorize that if leaders could attempt to understand their adversaries by putting “oneself in the other 
fellow’s place” (1959, p. 249) and consider that they too may be motivated by fear as opposed to 
aggression, then this may hold the key to the de-escalation of conflicts. If security dilemma dynamics 
are the result of mutual misperceptions that fuel fear and mistrust, then, Herz theorized, the reverse 
may also be true that recognition of this fact could go some way to dampening the dilemma’s 
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effects.1 This sentiment has been echoed by others who have sought to explain how cooperation can 
be sparked within the context of security dilemma dynamics (e.g., Booth & Wheeler, 2008; Holmes, 
2018; Jervis, 1976, 1978; Wheeler, 2018). But while these scholars have in various ways alluded to 
empathy in unpacking this puzzle, they have for the most part left it largely untheorized. In this sense, 
the security dilemma’s treatment of empathy resembles what Hutchinson and Bleiker (2014) de-
scribe as the “somewhat paradoxical situation where emotions have been implicitly recognized as 
central [to IR] but, at the same time, remained largely neglected” (p. 494). In drawing out this con-
nection between empathy and the security dilemma, the article also hopes to go some way towards 
reclaiming the psychological foundations of security dilemma theorizing. As Shiping Tang (2009, 
pp. 621–622) has observed, ever since Robert Jervis placed psychology front and center in security 
dilemma thinking (Jervis, 1976), the field has turned away from psychological factors in favor of 
studying material variables. (Re)locating empathy in security dilemma theorizing goes some way 
towards redressing this imbalance.
This article attempts to address these omissions by drawing upon diverse literatures in order 
to argue that the development and expression of empathy is pivotal to the de-escalation of security 
dilemma dynamics both prior to and during interaction. This is done in two steps. The first is to bring 
contemporary empathy research to bear on security dilemma thinking. Dominant understandings of 
empathy have emerged, particularly from neuroscience, that define empathy as an automatic neu-
ral activity which facilitates mind reading and emotional contagion with little need for conscious 
agency. This view of empathy is often described as basic, automatic, or affective empathy as it hap-
pens at the intuitive and unconscious level (Iacoboni, 2008; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 
1996). Research of this kind has been seized upon by some IR scholars as a means of explaining how 
adversaries can come to read one another in face-to-face settings, understand each other’s intentions, 
and potentially overcome conflicts (Hall & Yarhi-Milo, 2012; Holmes, 2013, 2018; Wong, 2016). 
While there is value in these perspectives, not least in improving understandings of face-to-face dip-
lomatic interaction, this article shows how they alone cannot explain the complexities of empathizing 
across security dilemma dynamics. It contrasts these perspectives with those that emphasize the de-
liberate, motivated, and conscious elements of empathy, which it argues are profoundly necessary to 
account for how empathy can develop in the complex context of actors ensnared in security dilemma 
dynamics. In making this distinction, the article argues that empathy development, which it locates 
primarily at the individual level, can positively impact upon de-escalation by leading actors to mod-
erate their positions on key issues of contestation, reinterpret their interests, and broaden the zone of 
possible agreement between themselves and their adversary.
The second step is to illustrate these dynamics empirically. A “plausibility probe” (George 
& Bennett, 2005, p. 75) is conducted to highlight the relevance of empathy for security dilemma 
de-escalation. This is achieved by exploring the role of empathy in the de-escalation of tensions 
between the United States and Iran between 2009 and 2016; a case that is predominantly explained 
by prevailing material factors, such as multilateral sanctions levied against Iran (e.g., Fabius, 2016; 
Miller, 2018; Nephew, 2018; Solomon, 2016). Drawing on primary interview material with Obama 
administration officials, I highlight the development of specific empathic capacities by key U.S. offi-
cials towards Iran during this period and link them to U.S. policy changes that unlocked the standoff 
with Iran over the latter’s nuclear program. The aim here is not to present a definitive causal account 
of empathy’s importance to this episode, but rather to highlight gaps in existing explanations and to 
encourage further research on empathy in security dilemma de-escalation.
1A brief definitional note is required. The security dilemma is defined in this article as the dual dilemmas of interpretation and 
response; the first being the dilemma of how to interpret the behavior of others and the second the dilemma of how to respond 
(Booth & Wheeler, 2008, pp. 4, 5). Security dilemma dynamics describe one possible outcome of the security dilemma, which 
is “hostility driven by mutual fear” (Wheeler, 2008, p. 495).
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The article proceeds in four parts. It first outlines existing perspectives on empathy in the se-
curity dilemma literature and highlights various contributions and limitations. Second, it examines 
how “automatic” accounts of empathy fare in the context of the security dilemma. Third, it argues 
that empathy can lead to moderation of views and reinterpretation of interests. Finally, the article 
explores the development of empathy by key U.S. officials prior to and during the Iran nuclear nego-
tiations in order to demonstrate the presence of empathy within an important contemporary example 
of security dilemma de-escalation.
Locating Empathy in Security Dilemma Theorizing
For a concept that is frequently characterized by fear and mistrust, it could seem counterintuitive 
to highlight the centrality of empathy to security dilemma thinking. Indeed, some scholars of the se-
curity dilemma have viewed empathy as futile due to the intentions of others being “inscrutable” and 
known only to the holder (Rosato, 2015; see also Mearsheimer, 2001). Others have similarly argued 
that the impossibility of accurately empathizing with one’s adversary is itself what causes security 
dilemma dynamics in the first place, leading to an “irreducible” level of insecurity (Butterfield, 
1951). Less fatalistic perspectives, however, reject this notion. Instead, they argue that it is entirely 
consistent to accept that one may never have absolute certainty about another’s mental state—known 
in the empathy literature as “empathic accuracy” (Ickes, 1993)—while rejecting the idea that actors 
will therefore always fail in their efforts to understand and act upon another’s motives and intentions 
(Booth & Wheeler, 2008; Herz, 1959; Jervis, 1976, 1978). This was first articulated by John Herz 
(1959), who wrote, in a pioneering passage, that:
For, if it is true… that inability to put oneself into the other fellow’s place and to realise his 
fears and distrust has always constituted one chief reason for the dilemma’s poignancy, it would 
then follow that elucidation of this fact might by itself enable one to do what so far has proved 
impossible—to put oneself into the other’s place, to understand that he, too, may be motivated 
by one’s own kind of fears, and thus to abate this fear. (p. 249)
In this passage, Herz recognized the counterfactual logic underpinning fatalist accounts of the secu-
rity dilemma; namely, that if these dynamics create conflict, it would then follow that understanding 
their workings would allow policymakers to take the steps necessary to mitigate their effects. Robert 
Jervis (1976), similarly saw an empathic understanding of the security dilemma as pivotal to over-
coming its effects. As he argued, “The first step must be the realisation, by at least one side but pref-
erably by both, that they are or at least may be, caught in a dilemma that neither desires” (p. 82). It is, 
for Jervis (1978), “failures of empathy” (p. 181) that create security dilemma dynamics and “empa-
thy and skilful statesmanship” (p. 212) that contribute to how actors can chart a course out of them.
While Herz and Jervis did begin to orientate security dilemma thinking towards empathy, they 
did little to advance its explicit theorisation. Neither recognized the greatly contested nature of the 
concept, instead seeing it as an unproblematic part of everyday language. The first effort by security 
dilemma theorists to take empathy seriously and recognize its contested nature came from Booth and 
Wheeler (2008; see also Wheeler, 2018). Building on Herz and Jervis, they introduced the concept of 
security dilemma sensibility (SDS), which they described as “a particular expression of the general 
concept of empathy” (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 237). SDS, they explained, is:
an actor’s intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness 
towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to 
the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, 
crucially, the role that one’s own actions may play in provoking that fear. (p. 7)
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SDS’s key contribution is its implicit focus on reflexivity. If one comes to understand that an 
adversary’s behavior is motivated by fear, and that oneself has played a role in provoking that fear, 
then, by association, actors also learn something about themselves. SDS challenges the intuitive no-
tion that empathy is solely orientated towards understanding others, instead suggesting that self-un-
derstanding can and should stem from this.
Booth and Wheeler (2008) say little, however, about the relationship between the initial em-
pathic understanding of one’s adversary, and how actors then “show responsiveness towards” (p. 7) 
them. Indeed, the security dilemma literature more broadly provides no clear explanation for how 
this responsiveness stems from the “ability to understand the role that fear might play” (p. 7). It has 
shown the importance of an actor’s initial empathic realization of the nature of their predicament, but 
it gives little indication of the role empathy may play in continuing down the path of de-escalation. 
Empathy at its most basic level is an internal mental process, and thus it should not be assumed that 
this internal process will automatically get externalized into empathically motivated behavior. If 
empathy is to be understood as a state of “immanent potential” (Head, 2016a, p. 102), then a more 
nuanced understanding needs to be advanced of how this potential can be realized and externalized 
communicatively towards the target of one’s empathy. In short, how empathy is communicated, if 
it is even communicated at all, will likely be crucial to whether or not processes of de-escalation 
succeed.
What security dilemma theorizing has missed, therefore, is that the communication of one’s 
empathy—as well as other practices of reassurance that follow from an initial realisation—is itself 
an empathically determined practice. Holmes and Yarhi-Milo (2017) capture this in part, arguing 
that “conveying empathy to the other may be as important as actually possessing it” (p. 109). While 
the reflexive inference that the other is acting from fear is vital, they recognize that for empathy to 
be effectual to deescalating security dilemma dynamics “actors must convey it to others” (p. 110). 
But they also remain unhelpfully wedded to the idea that empathy is an internal process that can be 
analytically separated from its external expression or conveyance. Discussing the failure of the 2000 
Camp David Summit, they argue that Bill Clinton was “an empathic person, but on this occasion, he 
did not express it” (p. 107). However, an individual cannot be said to have strong empathic capac-
ities in a relational setting if they are unable to communicate these capacities effectively. Empathy 
is a relational capacity (Main, Walle, Kho, & Halpern, 2017) of which communication should be 
considered a central indicator of the strength of an individual’s empathy. If an actor cannot express 
their empathy towards their adversary in an effective manner, this is not just a failure of conveyance 
or communication but a failure of empathy itself. Empathy and communication are two sides of the 
same coin; empathy entails internalizing and appreciating the context in which a counterpart will re-
ceive a particular signal and then constructing that signal accordingly. Empathy in security dilemma 
thinking so far has lacked this communicative aspect, effectively ceasing to theorize empathy beyond 
its initial internal manifestations.
Despite these limitations, the security dilemma literature does provide a number of key points 
for thinking about empathy in this context. First, it cautions that while the search for “empathic ac-
curacy” (Ickes, 1993) as the antidote for conflict-promoting misperceptions is a futile one, this need 
not rule out the place of empathy in security dilemma thinking. While not all empathic efforts will 
result in starting down the path of de-escalation, empathy is nevertheless a necessary if not a suffi-
cient condition for processes of de-escalation between actors caught in security dilemma dynamics. 
And second, it has identified reflexivity as critical to empathy in this context as empathy entails not 
solely taking the perspective of another but also considering how the other experiences oneself. The 
next two sections build upon these propositions by exploring them in relation to the wider empathy 
literature.
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“Automatic” Perspectives on Empathy
IR’s neglect of empathy is not mirrored in other disciplines, where many are in the midst of an 
empathy boom. These debates are dominated by contemporary neuroscientific research that tends 
to define empathy in “automatic” terms (Iacoboni, 2008; Preston & de Waal, 2002; Rizzolatti et al., 
1996). Automatic empathy can be understood as how individuals are able to automatically and in-
stantaneously make sense of the observable actions and expressions of others. When one person sees 
another experience physical pain, it is the process that causes them to recoil and “feel” their pain. It is 
how individuals are able to recognize another’s visual displays of emotion, such as facial expressions 
of sadness or anger. These processes happen almost instantaneously and are not the product of active 
deliberation or theorization. As leading neuroscientist Marco Iacoboni (2008) argues, empathy “is 
not an effortful, deliberate pretence of being in somebody else’s shoes. It is an effortless, automatic, 
and unconscious inner mirroring” (p. 120). Instead of relying on folk psychological theories that 
are accumulated throughout life—a school of thought often labeled “Theory Theory” (Goldman, 
2008)—automatic accounts propose that humans mirror the emotions and actions of others in their 
brains through complex processes of neural simulation. They contend that our brains are uncon-
sciously and actively trying to work out what others are thinking and feeling through this shared 
neural architecture (Goldman, 2008; Holmes, 2018; Iacoboni, 2008).
Ideas about this mirroring system and other forms of “fast thinking” have become increasingly 
influential in IR. Most pertinent for the security dilemma literature, mirroring systems have been 
invoked in order to explain how adversaries can come to understand one another and how this can 
facilitate the transformation of adversarial relations. At its core, this literature argues that the dis-
covery of the mirroring system, along with other similar phenomena, should prompt IR scholars to 
fundamentally rethink their approach to the other minds problem, particularly in face-to-face settings 
(Hall & Yarhi-Milo, 2012; Holmes, 2013, 2018; Wong, 2016). Contrary to the fatalist belief that 
another’s intentions in international politics are inscrutable, these perspectives state that face-to-face 
diplomacy is a uniquely information-rich environment where diplomats are able to unconsciously 
discern the intentions of their counterparts while also inadvertently signaling their own intentions. 
The claimed implications of this are vast, with Holmes (2018) arguing that these mirroring systems 
provide “sophisticated, precise, and reliable access to the minds of others… [which] severely un-
dercuts the problem of intentions… and more broadly, the security dilemma itself” (p. 241). Wong 
(2016), drawing on a similar body of research, similarly argues that face-to-face interaction “enables 
practitioners to exchange individual-level expressions of intentions” (p. 145). These views are prev-
alent in the neuroscience literature also, where Iacoboni (2008) argues that “By helping us recognize 
the actions of other people, mirror neurons also help us to recognize and understand the deepest 
motives behind those actions, the intentions of the other individuals” (p. 6). If these insights are cor-
rect, they fundamentally transform current understandings of the security dilemma as constituted by 
“existential uncertainty” (Booth & Wheeler, 2008) and suggest that IR theorists have overstated the 
difficultly of empathic accuracy.
While this body of work has done much to advance our understanding of the importance of 
face-to-face interaction in international politics, there are good reasons to question the applicability 
of these findings to the security dilemma. For one, “automatic” perspectives at times lack an ap-
preciation of how empathy can be deliberate, motivated, and conscious, all of which are arguably 
necessary components for the development of reflexive understandings of self and other. Second, 
and relatedly, the exclusive focus on interpersonal interaction and “fast thinking” has obscured the 
fact that in certain contexts the development of empathy may well preclude this particular modality 
and develop at a distance and over time. These two points are related: If we are to account for how 
reflexive understandings of an adversary can develop in the absence of face-to-face contact, then we 
need to be able to theorize empathy as deliberate and motivated as well as automatic and intuitive.
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These objections find support from a wide-ranging literature that attests to empathy being more 
than the process of automatically simulating the minds of others in face-to-face settings, particularly 
in complex social contexts. For the most part, scholars do not deny the existence of a mirroring 
system, nor the core claims of a simulationist theory of mind. Rather, they simply claim that au-
tomatic accounts are limited in the type of empathy they can explain. The neuroscientist, Jamil 
Zaki (2014), argues that “Although empathy can be automatic, by no means is it always automatic. 
Instead, this phenomenon is deeply context dependent and varies along with numerous situational 
features” (p. 1608 emphasis in original; see also Decety & Lamm, 2006; Singer & Lamm, 2009). 
The philosopher Karsten Stueber (2010) similarly contends that “One can grant the centrality of 
basic empathy to interpersonal relations while claiming that explanation, prediction, and interpre-
tation of an agent’s complex social behaviour requires knowledge of a folk-psychological theory as 
proposed by a theory-theorist” (p. 219; see also Mitchell, 2009, p. 130). This paints a broad picture 
of empathy as distinctly multifaceted with different systems being utilized for different contexts and 
social complexities. If we take instances of security dilemma dynamics as a particular social context, 
it should be clear that its unique characteristics and complexities will influence how, and indeed 
whether, empathy develops and how it is expressed. This follows recent research calling for greater 
acknowledgement of the ways in which unique contexts and political realities mediate and modify 
the function of emotion and emotional processes (Halperin & Pliskin, 2015; Hutchison & Bleiker, 
2014; Tang, 2011, p. 727).
This fusing of politics, context, and psychology is particularly important for our present pur-
poses as some scholars have argued that the development of empathy in cases of intergroup conflict 
is less likely to be of the automatic kind, due in large part to the cognitive effort required to take the 
perspective of those with radically different views to oneself (Coplan, 2011; Zaki, 2014, p. 1611). 
Security dilemma dynamics, consequently, as a form of intergroup conflict, contain a number of 
distinctive characteristics that may directly moderate how—or indeed if—empathy develops and 
leads to de-escalation. These characteristics include—but are not limited to—(1) the protracted and 
often intractable nature of many security dilemma dynamics; (2) that the belief systems of actors em-
broiled within security dilemma dynamics that are often highly resistant to change (Finlay, Holsti, & 
Fagan, 1967; Larson, 1994); (3) the fact that these actors often hold peaceful/defensive self-images 
of themselves while imputing malign motives and intentions to the other (Booth & Wheeler, 2008; 
Butterfield, 1951; Wheeler, 2018); (4) the prevelance of negative images of the other that will often 
be institutionally and habitually embedded within state bureaucracies and organizations; and (5) that 
actors on both sides that will likely hold vastly differing interpretations of the key features and issues 
that constitute the conflict (Kelman, 1978, 1987).
Taken together, these characteristics make instances of security dilemma dynamics hard cases 
for empathy development and emphasize just how difficult it can be for actors to take an adversary’s 
perspective. This corresponds with research that shows empathy to operate most strongly in ingroup 
settings, effectively meaning that empathy is more commonly found between those who share simi-
lar traits and characteristics (Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011; Crawford, 2014, p. 541). The implica-
tion of this is that empathy towards those in outgroups, where difference is a pervasive characteristic, 
is scarcer and more difficult to achieve than it is towards ingroups (Head, 2016b, p. 171). As the 
philosopher Amy Coplan (2011) has put it, “the more unlike a target we are, the more difficult it is to 
reconstruct her subjective experiences”; the consequence being that “with whom we fail to identify, 
we must work harder” (p. 58). Understanding the deeper meaning behind another’s expressions, 
actions, or language therefore requires not solely unconscious simulation, but an active reflection of 
the broader social context from which these emotions, expressions, and actions emerge. While an 
account of automatic empathy is crucial to understanding the function of empathy at a basic level, 
there are good reasons to think that neuroscience “is not sufficient, in and of itself, to understand how 
emotions work in social contexts, especially complex ones” (Reus-Smit, 2014, p. 537).
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This effortful and difficult kind of empathy becomes profoundly necessary if an actor is to try and 
understand the why behind another’s behavior. Even where one can be relatively certain that they’ve 
accurately understood another’s behavior, automatic empathy alone will tell them little about why the 
other is feeling or acting a particular way. For this, the empathizing actor must consider the broader 
context that gives rise to their behavior. Dan Zahavi (2014) argues that “We shouldn’t forget that emo-
tions… are about something… and it is not enough simply to pay attention to their expressions; we 
also need to look at the context in order to determine what they are about” (p. 163; see also Crawford, 
2014, p. 54; Hollan, 2012). This is crucial for our present purposes as an understanding of the “why”—
or in other words the motivation—behind an expression or action that must be central to theorizing 
empathy in the security dilemma. Security dilemma scholars have highlighted that attention should be 
paid not just to how actors’ read one another’s intentions (how the other intends to behave), but also to 
their motivations (why the other behaves as they do) (Booth & Wheeler, 2008, p. 300; Glaser, 2010, 
p. 38). If empathizing with an adversary is to have any impact upon de-escalation, it is insufficient 
to only consider what the other feels; it is also necessary to try and comprehend why they feel it. If 
empathy is to instigate a process of de-escalation, then it should not just entail realizing that the other 
person is angry, but it must entail the act of reflecting upon why they are angry as well. Knowing, for 
instance, that Iranian leaders feel historically disrespected by the United States (Duncombe, 2016) is 
related but also fundamentally distinct to actively contemplating why this is the case. For this, an actor 
must consider the cultural, historical, and political context in which these feelings are embedded and 
expressed. This will likely entail a reflexive as well as reflective imagining, as oneself or one’s group 
may have played a fundamental role in producing and reproducing that context.
Reducing empathy in adversarial settings to a problem of intentions therefore misses the point 
that motives—understood as the why behind particular emotion, expression, or action (Booth & 
Wheeler, 2008, p. 300)—are fundamental to theorizing why other actors behave in particular ways. 
As I will show later in this article, the development of a reflexive understanding of Iran’s perspective 
on the nuclear issue and their relationship with the United States—which initially developed prior to 
face-to-face interaction—was crucial to unlocking the stand-off between these two states over Iran’s 
nuclear program.
Empathy, Interests, and Agency
The previous section painted a picture of empathy development in adversarial settings as a diffi-
cult and demanding task, both cognitively and emotionally. This should not be taken as confirmation 
of the fatalist view that empathy in this context is either impossible or futile. Rather, it serves to 
press the point that empathy of this kind entails more than what “automatic” theories of empathy can 
account for. Empathy should, instead, be considered as the attempt to take the perspective of other 
actors in relation to a specific issue or set of issues, and, crucially, the reflexive consideration of the 
role oneself or one’s group may have played in the production and reproduction of the other’s per-
spectives. This section seeks to expound upon various aspects of this definition and to relate empathy 
of this kind to sympathy, interests, and agency.
The definition of empathy given above demarcates it from similar concepts such as sympathy, 
which is important given the frequent conceptual slippage in the literature (Wispé, 1986, p. 318). 
While there is no consensus regarding how to distinguish between these concepts (Zahavi, 2012), 
Ralph White’s (1984) demarcation is highly pertinent. He argues that:
Empathy… is distinguished from sympathy, which as defined as feeling with others—as being 
in agreement with them. Empathy with opponents is therefore psychologically possible even 
when conflict is so intense that sympathy is out of the question… We are not talking about 
warmth or approval, and certainly not about agreeing with, or siding with, but only about real-
istic understanding. (p. 160)
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Empathy does not, therefore, require the empathizing actor to agree with the worldview, actions, 
or beliefs of the other in order to try and take their perspective. As White notes elsewhere, “Empathy… 
does not necessarily imply sympathy, or tolerance, or liking, or agreement with that person—but 
simply understanding” (1991, p. 292). Sympathy on the other hand denotes some form of agreement 
or concern with the object of one’s sympathy and is therefore different than attempting to understand 
another individual or group against which you may feel strongly. One may vehemently disagree with 
the actions and worldview of another, but it is still possible to imaginatively see things from their 
perspective and understand why, to them at least, their actions might seem justified. This manifested 
itself in the Obama administration’s approach to Iran, with one senior U.S. official stating that “you 
have to have a certain degree of strategic empathy in any kind of negotiation…. It doesn’t mean you 
have to accept or indulge another narrative, but you’ve got to understand it.”2
But while the act of empathizing with another does not imply agreement, it can lead to mod-
eration of one’s position on various issues and therefore increase the zone of possible agreement 
between two conflicting actors. In literature on conflict resolution and management, there is wide-
spread recognition that modification of how one perceives their adversary—which entails consider-
ing how one’s adversary views important elements of the conflict and wider relationship—is a key 
prerequisite to collaborative problem solving and successful negotiation (Kelman, 1978, 1987; Ross, 
1993). Marc Ross (1993), for instance, has argued that as “empathy develops, exchanges are more 
effective, parties are more open to a range of options that speak to each party’s interests, and viable 
agreements become more attractive to all” (pp. 107–108). The development of empathy can there-
fore impact how an actor perceives their own and the other’s interests, while opening up room for 
agreement on issues that had previously seemed intractable. Interests and preferences, which all too 
often are seen as the purview of rationalist scholarship, can therefore be considered “largely unmo-
tivated and directionless without affective dynamics” (Hall & Ross, 2015, p. 856; see also Crawford, 
2000; Rathbun, 2014) such as empathy. In other words, interests do not exist a priori to emotion and 
affect but are shaped by these phenomena (Damasio, 1995; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). 
The development and expression of empathy by state leaders consequently does not supersede or 
replace interests with some form of altruistic motivation, but instead gives direction and meaning 
to interests.
Adopting this understanding of the relationship between interests and empathy opens up space 
for acknowledging the multiple pathways through which actors understand, articulate, and pursue 
their interests. While rationalist scholarship in International Relations has focused on coercive 
pressure and bargaining as the primary means in which actors pursue their interests (e.g., Sechser, 
2018), rethinking the relationship between interests and empathy allows for a broader view that 
interests may also be effectively served through a range of activities such as the “pursuit of fair 
compromises and win-win outcomes” (Rathbun, 2014, p. 20). In this reading, the empathy Obama 
held towards Iran was pivotal in his view of how U.S. interests were best pursued. From the 2008 
presidential campaign onwards, he rejected the idea, prevalent during the Bush administration, 
that not talking to and isolating one’s adversaries was a viable way to pursue a state’s interests. 
Instead, he consistently argued that only through engagement and dialogue could these be achieved 
(Obama, 2007, 2008, 2015). As John Kerry (2016), the U.S. Secretary of State in the second Obama 
administration, put it in the context of the Iran negotiations, “Trying to understand adversaries is 
not a favour we do for them; it’s in our interests.” Viewing empathy in this way refutes narratives 
of empathy being “soft” or even capitulatory and instead recognised empathy in conflict settings 
and foreign policy as a “serious, difficult, and important enterprise” (McNamara & Blight, 2003, 
p. 257).
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What, then, are the prospects for empathy’s development in cases of deep mistrust and conflict? 
The first point to make is that successful de-escalation, of which empathy is a prerequisite, requires 
effective leadership. While empathy is something that can be taught and encouraged, for example 
through effective mediation (Holmes & Yarhi-Milo, 2017; Kelman, 1987), it is also a dispositional 
trait. Different individuals have varying abilities and motivations to try and empathize with others. 
There is therefore significant individual-level variation. If a leader is already “primed for empathy” 
(Wheeler, 2018, p. 151) and possesses an empathic disposition, then the prospects of that leader 
recognizing security dilemma dynamics at work and responding accordingly increase. If a leader 
does not already possess some level of empathy or displays personality tendencies that suggest lower 
levels of general empathy (e.g., narcissism), then the prospects for de-escalation of this kind are less 
promising. There are, however, at least two realistic ways in which empathy towards an adversary 
might develop. The first is because of a particular experience or event that shifts the way a leader 
perceives their adversary. The classic example here is the Able Archer crisis of November 1983, 
where U.S. President Ronald Reagan came to believe that Soviet officials had wrongly interpreted a 
NATO missile simulation as an incoming nuclear attack. Reagan was so shocked that Soviet leaders 
could misinterpret U.S. intentions and genuinely believe that the United States were capable of such 
an act that he became “convinced that he had to find a way of reassuring Soviet leaders” (Wheeler, 
2018, p. 152).
The second is through iterated rounds of face-to-face interaction, where leaders come to identify 
with one another through processes of humanization (Wheeler, 2018). This can lead them to reinter-
pret their individual problems as shared problems (Kelman, 1978). While both of these mechanisms 
help to explain how empathic capacities can emerge and increase in intensity, in the absence of either 
mechanism it seems unlikely that leaders once in office will become more empathic towards adver-
saries without some kind of stimuli. To explain how empathy towards an adversary can develop at a 
distance, therefore, a great deal of emphasis must be placed on the existing dispositional capacities 
of particular leaders. Thus, while empathy is something that can indeed be learnt, there is currently 
little reason to hold out much hope that leaders with low-empathic capacities will be able to develop 
this while in office. That first Obama, and then Kerry, already possessed high levels of empathy is an 
important reason why de-escalation with Iran happened when it did. As Tang (2011) has noted in the 
context of reconciliation, “successful reconciliation requires effective leadership” (p. 734). The same 
is true for empathically motivated de-escalation.
That de-escalation of this kind is highly dependent upon the right leaders being in office does 
not preclude the possibility that collectives can take on empathic traits through mechanisms such 
as contagion and institutionalization (Crawford, 2014). Arguably, effective institutionalization of 
empathy towards former adversaries is required if de-escalation is to lead to more lasting forms of 
cooperation. But it is important to recall that a key contextual characteristic of security dilemma 
dynamics can be embedded bad-faith thinking within state bureaucracies and institutions. Given 
this, it is logical to conclude that empathy of this kind will likely begin at the individual rather than 
collective level. If empathy towards adversaries (or former adversaries) is to become institutionalized 
into wider collectives, then these processes will likely be top down in nature. When individual-level 
empathic moves are successful in leading to some form of de-escalation, this can over time have a 
meaningful impact upon collective beliefs concerning former adversaries, and, in particular, lead to 
a collective form of redressing negative narratives and beliefs. Empathy that remains primarily at the 
individual level and is insufficiently institutionalized can, however, be fragile, leaving it vulnerable 
to rupture in the event of changes in leadership. As I clarify below, the case of U.S.-Iran relations is 
at once an important contemporary case of de-escalation dynamics between entrenched adversaries, 
while also serving as a cautionary note for the fragility of empathy development that does not be-
come sufficiently institutionalized.
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Empathy and De-escalation Between the United States and Iran
The implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the nuclear deal 
reached between Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, 
and Germany)—in January 2016 marked the culmination of a dramatic de-escalation of tensions 
between the United States and Iran. Although this de-escalation has undergone an equally dramatic 
reversal due to the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of sanc-
tions (Al Jazeera, 2018), the 2009–16 period nevertheless stands as an important contemporary case 
of security dilemma de-escalation. These events have thus far primarily been explained as resulting 
from overwhelming coercive pressure held against Iran in the form of a stringent multilateral sanc-
tions regime (Fabius, 2016; Miller, 2018; Nephew, 2018; Solomon, 2016). While the role of sanc-
tions should not be ignored as they clearly played a role in enabling the conditions for successful 
de-escalation, insufficient attention has been paid to the development of empathy both prior to and 
during the diplomatic encounters themselves. This section rectifies this by drawing attention to the 
development of specific empathic capacities by high-ranking U.S. officials towards Iran and their 
nuclear program. Using the U.S.-Iran case as a plausibility probe, this section argues that these em-
pathic capacities played a significant role in the de-escalation of tensions as they effectively commu-
nicated flexibility on the part of the Obama administration and opened up negotiating space on key 
issues that previously did not exist. What proved transformative was not just the reflexive inference 
that oneself may have been complicit in causing the other’s insecurity, but that this inference was 
effectively communicated through concrete policy proposals. These claims are supported by data 
collected through a series of semistructured interviews with 13 former Obama administration offi-
cials involved in the negotiations and foreign policy towards Iran more broadly. The officials are kept 
anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the material they discussed.
The antecedents of de-escalation are found in the Obama administration’s early efforts to reach 
out to Iran and change the nature of the relationship. From early in the administration’s tenure, it was 
clear that Obama and some, though by no means all, of his key advisors held some level of empathy 
towards Iran that ran counter to prevailing U.S. foreign policy wisdom. This was born of the reflexive 
inference that past U.S. administrations were at least partly responsible for causing Iranian insecurity 
and stoking security dilemma dynamics between the two states. Obama sought to communicate this 
to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, both privately and publicly. In a still classified 
April 2009 letter to Khamenei, which interviewees described to me, Obama explicitly stated that the 
United States had no malign intentions towards the Iranian government and was not trying to subvert 
it.3 Similarly, in a public address to mark Nowruz, the Persian New Year, Obama was the first U.S. 
president to call Iran by its full name: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Officials have stated that this was 
an effort to try and convey legitimacy towards the regime while approaching it with respect.4 While 
these moves were initially unable to cut through the deep levels of mistrust and were arguably under-
mined by the administration’s later efforts to further sanction Iran (Parsi, 2012), they were an early 
indication of the empathic capacity to reflexively consider one’s own role in stoking insecurity and 
responding accordingly.
Obama made similar proclamations later in his presidency and directly linked this kind of empa-
thy to the JCPOA. The day after the JCPOA was agreed Obama (2015) stated that:
you have to have the capacity to put yourself occasionally in their shoes… the fact is that we 
had some involvement with overthrowing a democratically elected regime in Iran. We have had 
in the past supported Saddam Hussein when we know he used chemical weapons… I think that 
3Interviews 1 and 2
4Interviews 1 and 2
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when we are able to see their country… in specific terms, historical terms, as opposed to just 
applying a broad brush, that’s when you have the possibility at least of some movement. 
Here, Obama acknowledged both the existence and the legitimacy of some of the grievances Iran has 
held against the United States and the importance of understanding, if not agreeing with, the narra-
tive they tell about themselves and their relationship with the United States. These reflexive empathic 
capacities were also highlighted by interviewees, with one former official stating that, a “character-
istic of his [Obama’s] leadership was that he would ask the analysts and others in the room, how is 
the other country perceiving our actions?”5 Another interviewee similarly said that, “I think you had 
a President and a Secretary of State [John Kerry] who, more so than any of their predecessors, were 
the type of people who were able to see issues from the perspective of their adversaries, and doing so 
was helpful.”6
Many of these empathic inferences were not formed through interpersonal interactions but were 
the product of prior-held beliefs and intuitions alongside sustained internal deliberation. Interviewees 
attested that this was a top-down process that began with the president, and later with Kerry, who 
became Secretary of State in January 2013. Current theories of empathy that emphasize its develop-
ment through face-to-face interaction therefore need to be supplemented by additional perspectives 
in instances where face-to-face interaction was mostly absent. While there had been various face-to-
face encounters between U.S. and Iranian officials prior to 2013, they took place in large multilateral 
plenaries which U.S. officials described as “horrible meetings” where the Iranians were “obstructing 
any kind of diplomatic process.”7 It is therefore more accurate to say that many initial empathic in-
ferences towards Iran developed in spite of face-to-face interactions rather than because of them.
In addition to a general reflexive recognition of Iranian insecurity and the U.S. role in producing 
it, these empathic capacities manifested themselves in two interrelated ways that proved pivotal to 
creating the space needed for productive negotiations. The first related to Iran’s uranium enrichment 
capacity and the second to Iran’s domestic political context. Regarding the former, Iran’s uranium 
enrichment capacity was both the jewel in Iran’s nuclear crown as well as the primary area of U.S. 
concern. Official U.S. policy during the Bush administration, which was backed up by multiple 
UNSC resolutions, was that Iran must suspend all enrichment activities prior to substantive negotia-
tions. This began to change early in Obama’s presidency. The administration dropped the precondi-
tion (MacAskill, 2009) and began private deliberations which gradually acknowledged that complete 
suspension of enrichment was an unrealistic goal that would be counterproductive to meaningful 
negotiations.8 This capacity to recognize the importance of enrichment and to adjust the U.S. posi-
tion accordingly was crucially formed before the diplomatic track was established. U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of State, William Burns (2019), reports in his memoir, which is substantiated by multiple 
interviews, that the decision to put the enrichment card on the table was one that was discussed pri-
vately within the administration long before it was communicated externally to the Iranians.9 The 
president and his key advisors fretted over how and when to make this communication to the Iranians, 
ultimately authorizing Burns to indicate to the Iranians at a March 2013 secret bilateral meeting in 
Oman that the United States was willing to “explore the possibility of a limited domestic enrichment 
program as part of a comprehensive agreement” (Burns, 2019, p. 361).
This shift in U.S. policy was the culmination of an acknowledgment early in Obama’s presi-
dency that, as one negotiator put it, “If we [the United States] insisted on zero enrichment, we’re not 
5Interviews 3 and 4
6Interview 5
7Interview 1
8Interviews 9 and 10
9Interviews 2, 9, and 10
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going to get a deal, period.”10 It worked to unlock the standoff between the United States and Iran, 
with Burns (2019) reflecting that “there would have been no agreement if we had insisted on zero 
enrichment” (p. 384). This perspective coalesced with the second empathic capacity, which was to 
understand that Iran’s leaders needed to be able to sell any future potential deal to their domestic 
audience and that for them enrichment was a matter of modernity, progress, and national pride. As 
Abbas Araghchi, the senior Iranian negotiator, described it, their nuclear program and enrichment 
capability was “our source of national pride, our moon shoot” (quoted in Burns, 2019, p. 384). An 
inability to recognize Iran’s perspective had contributed to dooming past rounds of talks, and there is 
good reason to believe it would have done so here as well. Demonstrating the importance given to 
understanding Iran’s domestic constraints, one U.S. official expressed that “for both sides doing a 
deal like this requires… a lot of political capital… If you end up too far away from where the public 
is, it’s not going to work… He [Obama] had to understand [Iranian president] Rouhani’s politics as 
well as his own, in order to come to a place that would allow both to operate, to succeed.”11
American understanding of Iran’s perspective therefore played a large role in determining and 
moderating the U.S. negotiating position. Indeed, U.S. officials recognized that internalizing Iran’s 
narrative was crucial to success: “understanding what the other side’s narrative is going to be is es-
sential… in getting the agreement in the first place.”12 This narrative perspective became so embed-
ded in the U.S. position that one negotiator claimed, “Secretary Kerry could articulate [Iranian 
Foreign Minister] Zarif’s narrative about the [2015 Iran nuclear] deal about as well as Zarif could.”13 
This also contributed to a general sense in the Obama administration that being able to empathize 
with the Iranians was a valuable commodity that was not only necessary if the negotiations were to 
be successful, but also if U.S. interests were to be met. As one interviewee reflected, Obama and his 
key advisors saw “the value of having empathy across foreign policy issues” because “understanding 
their perception… and how they’ll respond to what we’re going to do is ultimately going to make you 
more successful.”14
As a result, negotiators were able to consistently find solutions to issues that had previously 
seemed intractable. Moreover, it was done in such a way to allow Iran to save face and claim domes-
tic victories while still meeting core U.S. interests concerning the future of Iran’s nuclear program. 
One U.S. official said that “both sides were able to… adjust the details [of the agreement] around 
their objectives in such a way that allowed the other side to get what they needed.”15 The place of 
Iran’s missile program in the negotiations also underscores this. While the Obama administration 
would have found it politically and strategically expedient for limits on Iran’s missile program to be 
included in the JCPOA, U.S. negotiators explicitly and empathically recognized the strategic and 
symbolic importance of Iran’s missile program to their sense of security and self. As one negotiator 
stated, “you have to understand the Iran-Iraq war… and how sanctions meant that Iran cannot have 
high-quality manned aircraft and that missiles were their only way of having a defence 
capability.”16
This evidence strongly suggests that the development of specific empathic capacities was an 
ever present and influential part of the de-escalation of tensions between the United States and Iran 
that culminated in the JCPOA. While empathy was primarily found at the individual level within 
senior administration officials, and operated in a top-down manner, there was also in the latter months 
of Obama’s presidency a nascent process of institutionalization underway. After the JCPOA was 
10Interview 9
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agreed upon in July 2015, there remained the hard task of implementing and verifying the deal, 
which required almost daily interaction between multiple levels of the U.S. and Iranian governments. 
The level of contact from July 2015 to January 2017 was unprecedented given the fraught history 
between the two states. It became so sustained and ingrained that U.S. officials began to describe 
their relations with their Iranian counterparts, who had long been considered enemies, as “profes-
sional”17 and even “trusting.”18 One interviewee involved in implementation and verification of the 
JCPOA even spoke of a sense of “transitive credibility” that existed between officials, whereby the 
interpersonal connections between individuals—while still important—were beginning to be tran-
scended by institutionalized forms of credibility and confidence. The administration’s hope that the 
JCPOA could prove transformative as opposed to merely transactional was starting to bear fruit.19
Despite these signs of a nascent institutionalization of empathy—and perhaps even trust—it 
was not sufficient to withstand a change of leadership in the United States. This is precisely what so 
concerned John Herz (1959) when he first introduced empathy to security dilemma theorizing. While 
empathy may in the present allow actors to understand that mutual fear drives conflict, Herz cau-
tioned that there can be little certainty as to the “continuance of good intentions in the case of collec-
tive entities with leaders and policies forever changing” (p. 235). In the U.S.-Iran case, all progress 
towards institutionalizing empathy was abruptly undone when Donald Trump became president in 
January 2017, withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018, and instead pursued a policy of “maximum 
pressure” towards the Islamic Republic (Cooper, 2019). While empathy in security dilemma dynam-
ics may often proceed in a top-down manner, the U.S.-Iran case should sound a cautionary note as 
to the fragility of empathy that is primarily found at the individual level and that is insufficiently 
institutionalized. While a nascent process of institutionalization was underway, it was not sufficiently 
embedded to withstand the policy changes brought by the Trump administration. Individual-level 
empathy can be powerful in charting an initial course out of conflict. But turning successful de-esca-
lation into more sustainable forms of conflict transformation will require increased attention of how 
individual-level empathy can become further institutionalized within the habits and practices of state 
bureaucracies and institutions.
Conclusion
The development of empathy is centrally important to the de-escalation of security dilemma dy-
namics. Yet, the security dilemma literature has primarily exemplified Crawford’s (2000) observation 
that “Theories of international politics and security depend on assumptions about emotion that are 
rarely articulated and which may not be correct” (p. 116). The charge made here, therefore, is that 
in researching how security dilemma dynamics can be overcome, the literature has treated empathy 
as an unproblematic part of everyday language as opposed to a concept that is deeply contested 
across numerous disciplines. This neglect is unsurprising because, as others have noted, empathy 
has received scant attention from IR scholars despite the now well-established turn towards studying 
emotions (Head, 2016a, p. 95). By bringing the vast empathy literature to bear on security dilemma 
thinking, this article has attempted to shed further light on the role that empathy plays in instigating 
and sustaining processes of de-escalation between actors caught in security dilemma dynamics. In 
doing so, it has cautioned against the rapid embrace of solely “automatic” perspectives on empathy 
for this context. While merit can be found in researching the automatic, intuitive, and unconscious 
aspects of behavior, it highlighted the limitations of these perspectives when studying complex social 
contexts such as security dilemma dynamics. Instead, the article drew upon perspectives on empathy 
17Interview 12
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that emphasized its deliberate, effortful, and reflexive capacities and argued that these can lead actors 
to moderate their positions on key issues in the conflict, reinterpret their interests, and broaden the 
zone of possible agreement between themselves and their adversary.
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